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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES





ELIGIBILITY. The debtor originally filed for Chapter 13 
in August 2003 because the authority for Chapter 12 had expired 
on July 1, 2003 and had not yet been reinstated. Chapter 12 was 
retroactively reinstated 11 days later. In September 2003 the 
Chapter 13 trustee moved to dismiss the case for failure to file 
documents and the debtor moved to convert the case to Chapter 
12. In November 2003, the Bankruptcy Court scheduled the 
conversion motion for hearing in January 2004. The authority 
for Chapter 12 expired again on December 31, 2003 and at the 
conversion hearing, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the motion 
because the authority for Chapter 12 had expired. On appeal 
the appellate court noted that Section 348 states that conversion 
of a case under one chapter to one under another chapter did 
not affect the original petition date, the commencement date or 
the order for relief. Therefore, the court held that the law in 
effect on the original petition date is applicable to determine 
whether the debtor could file under Chapter 12. Because Chapter 
12 was authorized retroactively to the period of the petition 
date, the debtor could convert the case to Chapter 12. In re 
Campbell, 313 B.R. 871 (10th Cir. 2004). 
CONTRACTS

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR 
CONSUMPTION. The plaintiff was a dairy farmer and 
purchased alfalfa hay from the defendant and fed the alfalfa to 
the dairy cows. The plaintiff claimed that the cows became 
sick, had less milk production and died from eating the hay. 
The plaintiff had the hay tested and the tests showed that some 
of the hay contained aflatoxin. The plaintiff sued under breach 
of implied warranty and res ipsa loquitur negligence, which 
was dismissed prior to trial. At trial, the defendant argued that 
the plaintiff’s case was based on a common law theory of implied 
warranty of fitness for consumption and not a U.C.C. statutory 
cause of action. The trial court agreed and granted a directed 
verdict for the defendant on the basis that hay was a raw material 
for which no cause of action was available in Missouri. The 
court discussed the history of the common action for implied 
warranty of fitness for consumption by animals and determined 
that the action applied in two cases: (1) where the product is 
sold directly from one party to another, the action was available 
for injury caused by processed feed and raw feed; and (2) where 
the product is not sold directly between the parties, the action 
was available only for injury caused by processed and packaged 
feed sold and purchased in the original packaging. Thus, the 
court held that the directed verdict was improper because the 
hay was purchased directly from the defendant and the nature 
of the hay as raw material was irrelevant as to whether the action 
of implied warranty of fitness for consumption by animals was 
available to the plaintiff.  Watts v. Sechler, 140 S.W.3d 232 





AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS. The Economic Re-
search Service has issued its 2004 report on the economic out-
look for agriculture. The report provides historical estimates 
and forecasts of farm sector financial information that allow 
readers to gauge the financial health of the nation’s farmers 
and ranchers. The report is available on the web at http:// 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/so/view.asp?f=economics/ais-
bb/ Agricultural Income and Finance Outlook, AIS-82, Nov. 
2004. 
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued interim regulations 
which add Michigan, Louisiana and Arkansas as validated 
brucellosis-free states. 69 Fed. Reg. 67501 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY GUARANTEED LOAN 
PROGRAM. The Rural Business-Cooperative Service has 
adopted as final regulations to incorporate provisions outlined 
in Sections 6013, 6017, and 6019 of the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 104-424). The new 
regulations expand the eligibility for the Business and Industry 
Guaranteed Loan Program, provide for a simplified application 
form for loans of up to $600,000, and require specialized 
appraisals on collateral. 69 Fed. Reg. 64829 (Nov. 9, 2004). 
FARM LABOR. The National Agricultural Statistics Service 
has issued farm employment figures as of October 10-16, 2004. 
There were 1,173,000 hired workers on the nation’s farms and 
ranches the week of October 10-16, 2004, down 2 percent from 
a year ago. Of these hired workers, 851,000 workers were hired 
directly by farm operators. Agricultural service employees on 
farms and ranches made up the remaining 322,000 workers. 
All NASS reports are available free of charge on the internet. 
For access, go to the NASS Home Page at: http:/www.usda.gov/ 
nass/. Sp Sy 8 (11-04). 
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
ACT. The plaintiff was a grocery wholesaler who had purchased 
battered and coated frozen potato products. The plaintiff filed 
for bankruptcy and was concerned that the plaintiff would be 
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subject to the PACA trust for the battered and frozen potato 
products purchased but not paid for. Under 2003 USDA 
regulations, battered and coated potato products were defined 
as fresh vegetables. The plaintiff filed suit to have the new 
regulations declared invalid. The court first upheld the plaintiff’s 
ability to bring the suit even though the plaintiff failed to object 
to the new regulations. The court then examined the regulations 
to see if they were authorized by and consistent with the PACA 
provisions. The court found that PACA did not provide a 
definition of fresh vegetables but appeared to intend a broad 
definition in that it referred to vegetables of “every kind and 
character.”  The court held that the inclusion of battered and 
coated potato products in the definition of fresh vegetables did 
not exceed the authority of PACA and was a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute by the USDA. The court noted that 
the main purpose of PACA was to protect producers and the 
expansive definition of fresh vegetables was in keeping with 
that purpose. Fleming Companies, Inc. v. USDA, 322 F. 
Supp.2d 744 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
   FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The decedent’s estate 
consisted mainly of a right to receive large annual payments of 
a lottery prize won by the decedent. Although the decedent had 
established a trust which was to pay the estate taxes owed on the 
lottery payments, the trust was insufficient to pay the entire estate 
tax; therefore, the estate borrowed the remaining amount. The 
loan was to be repaid from future lottery prize installments. The 
estate claimed a deduction for the interest paid in the first year 
and filed a protective refund claim based on the estimated interest 
to be paid on the estate tax loan in future years. The IRS argued 
that the interest was not deductible because the estate failed to 
demonstrate that the loan was required for estate property 
administration. The estate argued that the loan was necessary 
because most of the estate assets were future payments and the 
current assets were insufficient to pay the estate tax. The estate 
also argued that the lottery payments could not be sold, although 
they could be assigned, and the estate’s judgment as to the best 
actions to preserve the estate should be upheld. The court held 
that, under Pennsylvania law, the right to the lottery installments 
could be sold or assigned; therefore, the burden was on the estate 
to prove that the choice of the loan was necessary. The court 
indicated that the best argument for the estate was that the sale 
of the right to receive lottery payments was similar to a forced 
sale of stock; however, the court held that the estate had not 
provided evidence to support that argument. Rupert v. United 
States, 2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,492 (M.D. Pa. 2004). 
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent was the remainder 
beneficiary of two trusts established by the decedent’s sister for 
the sister’s benefit. The trusts provided for termination of the 
trusts at the decedent’s death and distribution of the trust assets 
under the sister’s will. The sister’s will provided for distribution 
of the sister’s estate by passing one-half of the estate to the 
decedent. The sister predeceased the decedent and the decedent 
became the beneficiary of the trusts and one-half of the sister’s 
separate property. At the death of the decedent, the IRS claimed 
that the decedent’s estate included one-half of the trusts’ 
principal in that the sister’s will bequeathed one-half of her 
estate to the decedent. The decedent’s estate argued that the 
trust property did not pass to the decedent because the will 
bequest was to the decedent and not to the decedent’s estate, 
and because the decedent did not survive the termination of 
the trusts, the trust property passed under the trusts’ provisions 
to third parties. The court agreed with the estate’s argument 
and held that the sister did not intend for any of the trusts’ 
property to pass to the decedent or the decedent’s estate; 
therefore, none of the trusts’ property was included in the 
decedent’s estate for federal estate tax purposes.  Cameron v. 
United States, 2004-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,491 (W.D. 
Pa. 2004). 
VALUATION. The decedent owned two retirement accounts 
containing stock which passed under the estate to heirs. The 
estate argued that the value of the two accounts should be 
reduced to reflect the income tax liabilities incurred by the 
beneficiaries. The court considered the accounts as a collection 
of the assets, the stock included in the accounts, and not as 
single assets in themselves. Therefore, a willing buyer of the 
stock would not have any income tax liability and the income 
tax liability of the beneficiaries would not effect the value of 
the stock to a willing buyer.  The court noted that, under I.R.C.§ 
691(c), the beneficiaries were entitled to an income tax 
deduction for estate tax attributable to an asset received by 
inheritance. Estate of Smith v. Comm’r, 2004-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,493 (5th Cir. 2004), aff’g, 2004-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,476 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
AUTOMOBILE EXPENSES. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
denied certiorari in the following case. The taxpayer operated 
a music entertainment business which involved a band which 
performed for a fee. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for 
expense method depreciation and travel expenses for the van. 
The deductions were disallowed because the taxpayer failed 
to provide substantiation of the business use of the van and 
the business purpose for the expenses and because the van 
was placed in service in a personal activity in a prior taxable 
year. Kay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-197, aff’d, 2004-2 
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,405 (5th Cir. 2003). 
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer was an eye surgeon who owned 
a corporation which operated an eye clinic. The corporation 
hired a business manager and the taxpayer created other 
corporations with the manager to provide management services 
to other clinics and to operate an art gallery. The taxpayer 
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provided all of the assets for the corporations and claimed 
that the taxpayer expected the manager to reimburse the 
taxpayer for the manager’s share of the assets contributed to 
the corporation. The manager did pay some interest but did 
not make any principal payments to the taxpayer. The manager 
was eventually fired for refusing to follow the taxpayer’s 
orders and the taxpayer claimed bad debt deductions for the 
amounts not paid by the manager. The taxpayer argued that 
(1) the firing of the manager made the debts worthless, 
although the taxpayer did negotiate a settlement with the 
manager and (2) the debt was worthless because the manager 
was insolvent. The court held that the taxpayer failed to 
demonstrate that the firing of the manager was sufficient to 
make the debt worthless, the manager was not insolvent before 
the year the debt was claimed to be worthless, the taxpayer 
had no reasonable expectation of collecting on the debt in the 
future, and the taxpayer took sufficient, reasonable steps to 
collect on the debt. John v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004­
257. 
CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayer won a state lottery prize 
which was payable in annual installments over 25 years. The 
taxpayer received the first five installments and reported each 
as ordinary income. The taxpayer assigned the rights to the 
remaining payments in exchange for a lump sum payment 
which was reported as capital gains by the taxpayer. The court 
held that, consistent with many previous cases, the right to 
receive the lottery payments was not a capital asset but was 
taxable as ordinary income the same as the installment 
payments. Wolman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-262. 
DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was divorced and the 
divorce decree provided that the taxpayer and former spouse 
were to share the federal dependency exemptions by claiming 
the exemptions on alternate tax years. The taxpayer claimed 
dependent exemptions for two of the children and attached a 
copy of the divorce decree to the income tax return. The 
taxpayer did not obtain a Form 8332 from the former spouse 
and argued that the attachment of the divorce decree satisfied 
the requirements of Form 8332. The court held that the divorce 
decree did not satisfy the requirements because the decree 
did not state the specific tax years in which the taxpayer could 
claim the exemptions and the decree was not signed by the 
taxpayer or former spouse. Allsopp v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2004-154. 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer was 
the father of two children and lived with the taxpayer’s parent 
during the tax year involved. The taxpayer was employed and 
provided some support for the children but the parent had a 
higher income and provided the home without charge. 
Although the court noted that the taxpayer provided credible 
testimony as to the taxpayer’s support for the children, the 
court upheld the IRS denial of the dependency exemption for 
the taxpayer because the taxpayer failed to provide evidence 
of the value of the use of the parent’s home or the total value 
of all support. In addition, the court held that the taxpayer 
could not claim the earned income tax credit for the children 
because the parent was an “eligible individual” and earned more 
income in the tax year involved. Lear v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2004-253. 
The taxpayer was married but lived separately from the spouse. 
The couple had one child who lived with the spouse continually 
since birth. The New York Family Court issued an order requiring 
the taxpayer to pay weekly child support but did not include any 
provision as to which parent could claim the federal dependency 
exemption. Both the taxpayer and spouse claimed the child as a 
dependent on their income tax returns. The spouse did not fill 
out a Form 8332 release of the right to claim the dependency 
exemption. The court held that the taxpayer could not claim the 
child as a dependent on the taxpayer federal income tax return. 
Wells v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-153. 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. Under I.R.C. § 106(a), the gross 
income of an employee does not include employer-provided 
coverage under an accident or health plan. Thus, premiums and 
other amounts that an employer pays on behalf of an employee 
to an accident or health plan are not included in gross income. 
Treas. Reg. §1.106-1 provides that the exclusion from gross 
income extends to contributions which the employer makes to 
an accident or health plan on behalf of the employee and the 
employee’s spouse or dependents, as defined in I.R.C. § 152. 
The definition of dependent in I.R.C. § 152 was changed by the 
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA), Pub. L. 
No. 108-311, 118 Stat. 1166.  Because the reference to 
“dependents” under Section 106 appears only in the regulations 
under that section and not in the statute itself, Congress made no 
conforming amendments to Section 106 in WFTRA; therefore, 
the definition in the regulations differs from the definition in the 
statute. The IRS has announced that the definition in the Section 
106 regulations will remain in effect until conforming 
amendments can be made. Notice 2004-79, I.R.B. 2004-47. 
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES. The taxpayer was an employee 
of a company and agreed to perform services without 
compensation for several years while products were being 
developed. The taxpayer, however, did receive reimbursement 
payments for expenses incurred for the benefit of the company. 
The court found that the taxpayer did substantiate all expenses 
but that the taxpayer received excess reimbursements which were 
not required to be repaid; therefore, the court held that the 
reimbursement payments did not qualify as made under a plan 
or arrangement under Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2 and had to be included 
in income. Namyst v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-263. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was self-employed as a full 
time chiropractor and purchased a 115 acre farm used to breed 
and train horses. The horses were used primarily by the taxpayer’s 
family for pleasure riding, although some horses were sold for a 
small gain. The court held that the farm was not operated with 
an intent to make a profit because (1) the taxpayer did not keep 
accurate records of the income and expenses of the horse 
operation, (2) no attempt was made to analyze the operation to 
make it profitable, (3) no separate bank account was maintained 
for the horse operation, (4) the taxpayer had little experience in 
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the horse business and did not seek expert advice, (5) the losses 
offset income from other sources and (6) the taxpayer and family 
used the horses for recreation and personal use. Montagne v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-252. 
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayer was a 
public utility company. The state decided to build a new 
highway over a portion of land owned by the taxpayer and, 
under threat of eminent domain, negotiated with the taxpayer 
for purchase of the property. The purchase price included 
payment for relocation costs associated with the taxpayer’s need 
to move equipment located on the purchased land. The taxpayer 
sought a ruling that the portion of the purchase price allocated 
and used for the relocation costs would not be included in gross 
income. The IRS ruled that, under Rev. Rul. 58-396, 1958-2 
C.B. 403 and Graphic Press, Inc. v. Comm’r, 523 F.2d 585 (9th 
cir. 1975), the amounts received for relocation would not be 
included in gross income to the extent the amounts were used 
for relocation costs. Ltr. Rul. 200445004, July 16, 2004. 
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued a revenue 
procedure which provides that the standard mileage rate for 
2005 is 40.5 cents per mile for business use, 14 cents per mile 
for charitable use and 15 cents per mile for medical and moving 
expense purposes. The revenue procedure also provides rules 
under which the amount of ordinary and necessary expenses of 
local travel or transportation away from home that are paid or 
incurred by an employee will be deemed substantiated under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 when a payor (the employer, its agent, or 
a third party) provides a mileage allowance under a 
reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement to pay 
for such expenses. Use of a method of substantiation described 
in this revenue procedure is not mandatory and a taxpayer may 
use actual allowable expenses if the taxpayer maintains 
adequate records or other sufficient evidence for proper 
substantiation. Rev. Proc. 2004-64, I.R.B. 2004-47. 
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayer owned 
residential rental property and reported a loss of $2,635 for 
one tax year which offset income from other sources. The 
taxpayer’s income was $164,000 for that year and, under I.R.C. 
§ 469(i)(3), the amount of allowed passive losses allowed, 
$25,000, was reduced by one-half of the amount of income in 
excess of $100,000, eliminating the allowed amount for the 
taxpayer. ($164,000-$100,000 = 64,000; $64,000 x .5 = 
$32,000; $25,000 - $32,000 = 0 passive loss allowed) The court 
held that the taxpayer was not allowed a passive activity loss 
for the residential rental property.  Rahimi v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2004-156. 
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has published the cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLAs), effective on Jan. 1, 2005, applicable to 
dollar limitations on benefits paid under qualified retirement 
plans and to other provisions affecting such plans. The 
maximum limitation for the I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) annual 
benefit for defined benefit plans is increased to $170,000 and 
the I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) limitation for defined contribution 
plans is $42,000. Notice 2004-72, I.R.B. 2004-46. 
For plans beginning in November 2004 for purposes of 
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7), 
the corporate bond weighted average is 6.17 percent with the 
permissible range of 5.56 to 6.17 percent (90 to 100 percent 
permissible range). The 30-year Treasury securities rate for this 
period is 5.12 percent, the 90 percent to 105 percent permissible 
range is 4.61 percent to 5.38 percent, and the 90 percent to 110 
percent permissible range is 4.61 percent to 5.63 percent. Notice 
2004-77, I.R.B. 2004-47. 
The taxpayer obtained a loan from the taxpayer’s pension plan 
in 1998 and began making payments on the loan. Later that 
year, the taxpayer’s employment was terminated and, under the 
employer’s rules, no repayments on the loan could be made by 
the taxpayer. The former employer offset the loan in 2000 by 
applying the funds in the pension plan against the loan principal. 
The employer issued a Form 1099-R for 2000 listing the offset 
loan transaction as a distribution in 2000 from the pension fund. 
The taxpayer argued that, under I.R.C. §§ 402(a), 72(p)(1)(A), 
the distribution was deemed to have occurred in 1998 when the 
taxpayer stopped making regular payments on the loan because 
the loan no longer qualified for exception from treatment as a 
distribution. The court agreed and noted that subsequent 
regulations have established the rule that pension plan loans 
become taxable distributions when level amortization payments 
are not made. Molina v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-258. 
RETURNS. The IRS has issued Schedule J (2004), Income 
Averaging for Farmers and Fishermen; Form 1040A (2004), U.S. 
Individual Income Tax Return, and instructions; Form 1040EZ 
(2004), Income Tax Return for Single and Joint Filers With No 
Dependents;  Form 2106-EZ (2004), Unreimbursed Employee 
Business Expenses; Form 2441 (2004), Child and Dependent 
Care Expenses, and instructions; Form 4562 (2004), 
Depreciation and Amortization (Including Information on Listed 
Property); Form 8812 (2004), Additional Child Tax Credit; Form 
8851 (2004), Summary of Archer MSAs; Form 1040-SS (2004), 
U.S. Self-Employment Tax Return (Including the Additional 
Child Tax Credit for Bona Fide Residents of Puerto Rico), and 
instructions; Form 1040EZ (2004), Income Tax Return for Single 
and Joint Filers With No Dependents, and instructions; Form 
4797 (2004), Sales of Business Property (Also Involuntary 
Conversions and Recapture Amounts Under Sections 179 and 
280F(b)(2)), and instructions; and Form 8834 (2004), Qualified 
Electric Vehicle Credit.  The forms are available on the IRS 
web site, www.irs.gov/formspubs/index.html, in the Forms & 
Pubs section. The documents are available at no charge and can 
be obtained (1) by calling the IRS’s toll-free telephone number, 
1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676); (2) through FedWorld 
on the Internet; or (3) by directly accessing the Internal Revenue 
Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-8020. 
S CORPORATIONS 
EMPLOYEE. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari 
in the following case. The taxpayer was an S corporation with 
one shareholder who was also the sole officer and director. The 
taxpayer operated a business of veterinary surgical consultations 
for other veterinarians. The business operations were performed 
by the shareholder and the business was located at the 
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shareholder’s residence. The corporation did not have a separate 
bank account and the business and personal income and 
expenses were handled through the shareholder’s personal bank 
account. The corporation reported income for 1997 and 1998, 
deductions for compensation paid to officers, but no deductions 
for wages or salaries. The shareholder reported the shareholder’s 
share of income from the corporation on Schedule K-1 and 
Schedule E. The corporation did not withhold or pay any 
employment taxes. The court held that the shareholder was an 
employee of the taxpayer and the taxpayer was required to 
withhold, report and pay employment taxes. Nu-Lock Design, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,138 (3d 
Cir. 2004), aff’g, T.C.  Memo. 2003-52, cert. denied Nov. 11, 
2004. 
TRUSTS. An S corporation had two qualified subchapter S 
trusts as shareholders and had left over subchapter C earnings 
and profits. The corporation did not have sufficient cash to make 
cash distributions of the subchapter C earnings and profits and 
decided to distribute deemed dividends as allowed by Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1368-1(f)(3). A deemed dividend is treated as a 
distribution of the earnings and profits followed by an 
immediate contribution to the corporation. The issue was 
whether the trusts had to treat the deemed dividends as income 
to be distributed to the trust beneficiaries or as addition to 
principal for purposes of meeting the distribution requirement 
of I.R.C. § 1361(d)(3)(B). The IRS first noted that, under state 
law, if a trust agreement does not provide a rule for allocating 
(between income and principal), an item of income is to be 
allocated to principal. The IRS ruled that the deemed dividends 
were not required to be distributed to the trust beneficiaries in 
order to meet the distribution requirements of I.R.C. § 
1361(d)(3)(B). Ltr. Rul. 200446007, July 14, 2004. 




Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly 
Short-term 
AFR 2.48 2.46 2.45 2.45 
110 percent AFR 2.73 2.71 2.70 2.69 
120 percent AFR 2.97 2.95 2.94 2.93 
Mid-term 
AFR 3.54 3.53 3.51 3.50 
110 percent AFR 3.92 3.88 3.86 3.85 
120 percent AFR 4.28 4.24 4.22 4.20 
Long-term 
AFR 4.68 4.63 4.60 4.59 
110 percent AFR 5.15 5.09 5.06 5.04 
120 percent AFR 5.64 5.56 5.52 5.50 
Rev. Rul. 2004-106, I.R.B. 2004-49. 
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX. The maximum amount of 
annual wages subject to Old Age Survivors and Disability 
Insurance for 2005 is $90,000, with all wages and self-
employment income subject to the medicare portion of the tax. 
Notice 2004-73, I.R.B. 2004-46. 
STATE REGULATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
WAREHOUSES. The Nebraska Pubic Service commission 
(PSC) declared a grain elevator to be insolvent when it 
discovered that the elevator did not have sufficient grain in 
storage to meet all obligations. The PSC held hearings on claims 
made by grain producers and others that they had grain stored 
in the elevator.  Under PSC regulations, 291 Neb. Admin. Code, 
ch 8, § 001.01D, the proceeds of a failed elevator were to be 
distributed by the PCS to depositors, storers and owners of grain 
in the failed elevator on the day the elevator was taken over by 
the PSC. One claimant based its claim on warehouse receipts 
for purchases of grain from the elevator. The evidence 
demonstrated that, although the claimant made advance 
payments for the grain, the title to the grain was not considered 
to pass, both by the parties and by industry practice, until the 
claimant took delivery. The court held that the warehouse 
receipts for prepayment of grain were insufficient to make the 
claimant an owner, storer or depositor of grain in the failed 
elevator. In re Claims Against Atlanta Elevator, Inc. v. 
Roberts Cattle Co., 685 N.W.2d 477 (Neb. 2004). 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 
HERBICIDES. The plaintiff purchased a weed herbicide to 
use on the plaintiff’s commercial tulip bulb production fields. 
The defendant manufactured the herbicide and had obtained 
EPA approval for the label. The plaintiff claimed that the 
herbicide damaged the bulb crops and sued under theories of 
strict liability and negligence based on an improper label. The 
evidence showed that the EPA had required a change in the label 
to state that the herbicide was not to be used on commercial 
production bulb fields. The defendant argued that the action 
was preempted by FIFRA because the action was based on the 
label. The plaintiff argued that Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470 (1996), held that negligence actions were not preempted 
by FIFRA. The court noted that subsequent cases in the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the argument that Medtronic had changed the 
preemption rule; therefore, the plaintiff’s action was preempted 
by FIFRA. Vanderzanden Farms, LLC v. Dow Agrosciences, 
LLC, 323 F. Supp.2d 1075 (D. Or. 2004). 
CITATION UPDATES 
Gacke v. Prok Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004) 
(hog confinement facility) see p. 103 supra. 
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS

by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen 
January 7-8, 2005

Ramada Inn Yuma, AZ

Come join us in the desert sun for expert, practical and timely seminars on the essential aspects of 
agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and 
law instructors. The Ramada Inn is located near the Yuma, AZ airport and the Chilton Convention Center. 
Special guest room rates are available for seminar attendees. Call (928) 344-1050 for guest room reservations. 
The seminars will be held on Friday and Saturday, January 7 & 8, 2005. Registrants may attend one or 
both days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Friday, January 7, 2005 Dr. Harl will speak 
about farm and ranch income tax. Topics will include a review of the new tax legislation, depreciation, 
self-employment income, like-kind and involuntary exchanges, discharge of indebtedness income, sale of 
farm and ranch property, several types of farm income and deductions. 
On Saturday, Roger McEowen will cover many issues of farm and ranch business and estate planning. 
Topics will include special use valuation, formation and taxation of corporations and partnerships, limited 
liability companies, gift taxation, S corporations, estate planning aspects of corporations and partnerships, 
and employee status of shareholders and officers. 
Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended and 
lunch. 
The seminar registration fees for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural 
Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $185 (one day) and $360 (two days). The same fees 
apply for each one of multiple registrations from one firm. 
The registration fees for nonsubscribers are $200 (one day) and $390 (two days). 
All Digest subscribers will receive a brochure in the mail soon. Full information is also available online 
at http://www.agrilawpress.com  Contact Robert Achenbach at 541-302-1958, e-mail: 
Robert@agrilawpress.com 
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